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Introduction
This article explores the identity-formation of the 'ethnonational Us', focusing on how discourses of national identity are used to develop an affinity with a demonized Other. I employ a narrative analysis approach to a case study of eleven Israeli-Jewish dissidents. The hegemonic nationalist discourse in Israel -Zionism -constructs these dissidents' identities as the 'Virtuous (ethnic) Us', yet in various ways these individuals seek to connect with the 'Demonized Palestinian Other'. The dissidents invoke alternative national identity discourses that attempt to subvert these representations; however, not all alternative discourses enable the dissidents to speak coherently about their own situations.
Methodology
This article employs a constructivist approach to ethnic and national identity, taking Rogers Brubaker's (2004:11-12 ) perspective on disavowing groupism.
[T]he reality of ethnicity and nationhood -and the overriding power of ethnic and national identifications in some settings -does not depend on the existence of ethnic groups or nations as substantial groups or entities.
I treat Israeli-Jewish identity as the product of a discourse, not the property of a 'group'. This discourse -Zionism -was initially employed by political activists in Europe, invoking the claim to a long-standing ethnic Jewish nation with a right to Palestine (Sand 2009 ). The Jewish state subsequently reified the national identity depicted by the Zionist discourse, legally defining the personal identity of its Jewish and non-Jewish citizens, and indeed its non-Jewish subjects in the West Bank and Gaza. I use 'national identity discourses' to mean packaged ideas and ways of talking about Us and the Other. I suggest that alternative discourses attempt to modify or subvert the dominant Zionist discourse and locate these discourses within personal narratives collated from published works and interview responses of eleven Israeli dissidents, categorized as such because they dissent against the construction of their own identity, and that of the Other, as existential enemies.
The particular dissidents I analyse are not necessarily the most famous dissidents in Israel -indeed, some do not even identify as dissidents -nor do they represent a broad cross section of Israeli society.
However, all objectively belong to the privileged nation within an ethnocratic state (Ghanem, Rouhana, and Yiftachel 1998; Yiftachel 1999 Yiftachel , 2006 , fit somewhere between left-wing Zionism and anti-Zionism, and have re-examined their national commitments with concern for the Other. The initial choice of ten individuals enabled the use of qualitative analysis to explore multiple views; an additional individual was added while I was in Israel. I spoke to each person for between one and three hours in their homes, workplaces, or local cafes.
The dissidents in this study came to my attention because of the prominence of their voices in English-language media. All are educated and could be regarded as holding class privilege as well as national privilege in their society; all but one are male and all but (the same) one are white. An intraJewish division is deemed to exist between Ashkenazim, descendants of the founding European immigrants, and Mizrahim, 'Middle Eastern' Jews whose problematic status arises from linguistic, cultural, and geographical proximity to the Arab Other (Dahan-Kalev 2003; Shenhav 2002; Shohat 1999) . At great cost, Mizrahi Jews have been incorporated into a broader Jewish identity framed vis-à-vis the Palestinian Other; this latter boundary is my focus here.
The domination of my shortlist of dissidents by white middle-aged males reflects the structure of Israeli society and was something I sought to neither replicate nor resist. My selection was instead determined by questions like: Who had already produced material relating to the Other? Who had said or done something controversial? Who was available for an interview? Who could speak English well enough to converse frankly with a non-Hebrew speaker? Obviously, in exploring the narratives of a small number of individuals, I cannot offer a conclusive account of political dissent in Israel, nor explore deep political ramifications.
All individuals have numerous ways of performing identities, and these performances vary depending upon the context (Riessman 2008) . Identities can never be pinned down, and which identity is being performed at a given moment remains open to interpretation. A narrative analysis approach respects the right to multiplicity, eloquently expressed by novelist Dorit Rabinyan (2010) , who depicts a fluidity of movement between positions of Self and Other, universal and particular, 'Arab' and 'Jew'. This duality is what I consider to be human. What I consider to be alive. … It's the only way I know how things are, you know. There is no other mechanism I can refer except for seeing both all the time.
Using narrative analysis to explore these dissidents' existing publications and interview responseswhich I present as interconnected elements of their narratives -I leave their voices intact whilst recognizing that I am in a position of power as I utilize them towards a theoretical argument. I argue that the dissidents are attempting to enunciate alternative national identity discourses that enable them to reconcile their own identities with a desire to connect with or do justice for the Other. I use the word 'discontinuities' to describe features of their narratives that deviate from this purpose.
Discontinuities include omissions, the inability or unwillingness to answer certain questions, and the dissidents' own admissions of contradictions. Far from using these as weapons against the dissidents, I
instead turn them back to shed light on the dissidents' contexts.
The Dissidents
Oren Yiftachel is a political geographer at Ben Gurion University in Beersheva. He prefers the language-based signifier 'Hebrew' to describe his identity. I was curious how his scholarly critiques of Israel/Palestine manifest in his personal politics.
Yiftachel's colleague, political scientist Neve Gordon, supports the Boycott, Divestments, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign calling on the international community to withdraw support from Israel until the occupation is ended, making him a fascinating candidate for study. Rabinyan (2010) begins our interview with a proclamation of her Zionist credentials.
Uri Davis was born in
My state, my homeland, the place I belong to … is a Jewish state. … There's only one Jewish state around, on the globe, on earth, and this is mine, this is where I feel related to and identify with, and with its essence and values and definition to be Jewish. I find it the right thing to be.
But things start to look different when Rabinyan describes her connection to a Palestinian artist, Hasan Hourani, whom she met while living in New York. Rabinyan's (2004) essay, 'The Exile's Return', outlines the deep bond between the two 'exiles' and how it challenges her; Hourani frightens her with his aspiration for a binational state in Israel/Palestine, and his suggestion that they both miss the same 'home'. On his return from New York, Hourani drowns in Jaffa, after sneaking into Israel from the West Bank and choosing an unobserved place to swim. As Rabinyan celebrates his life and his dream that they could one day live in the same state, her more modest aspirations for a two-state solution are rendered uninspired by contrast.
In the interview, Rabinyan (2010) explains why she let Hourani win the political argument.
I couldn't say the last word, you know? I needed to have his saying float in the air … I had life! I had my ability to tell the story. He wasn't there to tell it … I feel it's the least I can do for him.
She also tells me that his binational state is a foil to her 'realistic' two-state solution. 'I needed to have 'The fact that I can see so many contradictions in the checkpoints', she goes on, 'is because the ones who are the soldiers and the Palestinian citizens, they look so much alike'. She invokes this similarity with Hourani again, speaking of 'something … very familiar with the way I felt to Arabness; that it wasn't coloured for me with fearful colours. It was something that I knew from within'. I ask if her Mizrahi identity made him seem less Other. 'No, he was the Other', she insists. 'I felt comfortable', she explains. More poignantly, she says of Hourani, 'He was familiar; he was in a way something lost that I found.' Yet when I remind Rabinyan how she began our interview, she immediately reverts to form. I refuse to be this, uh, humanistic cosmopolitan left-wing dreamer. I refuse to be. I [would] rather be seen as a nationalist than, than, not having clear borders of identity. Our need for a border is so crucial. Our need to know where we start and where we end. Rabinyan's narrative is filled with such juxtapositions: a deep connection with the Other that threatens to blur the boundaries between them, and a staunch reinvoking of boundaries. Rabinyan asserts that such a multiplicity is the essence of her identity -that I will find 'no one clear voice' -and perhaps such discontinuities carry the experience of Mizrahi womanhood in Israel. Nevertheless, no single discourse seems able to offer a coherent representation of Rabinyan's connection to Hourani; duality itself becomes the only possible language.
Meron Benvenisti
Discontinuities can also be found in the personal narrative of Meron Benvenisti, veteran analyst and commentator. Benvenisti's (2000) published work includes a detailed portrayal of how Zionist pioneers obliterated Palestine's Arab landscape, first with maps and terminology erasing and replacing names and details, and then physically, following the War of 1948. Benvenisti is nostalgic for a Palestine populated with Arabs/Muslims (Benvenisti 2000 (Benvenisti , 2007 , yet as an active participant in both the Zionist pioneer movement and the de-population of Arab Palestine, Benvenisti resists criticism of the project. Even as he argues that Zionism unhealthily fetishizes the state, he laments that he did not aspire to today's 'binational reality'.
'I am the one who is very upset about it' cause I wanted a Jewish state. The fact that it doesn't exist, or it cannot now it [is a] quasi-permanent binational regime, doesn't mean that I love it' (Benvenisti 2010) .
In 2004, Benvenisti wrote a soul-searching opinion piece, questioning whether the Jewish state was founded in an 'original sin' (the dispossession of another people), and seemingly answering in the affirmative (Benvenisti 2004 ).
Yet he angrily tells me:
It's wrong to quote back to a columnist or journalist something that he's written in one context. … You're talking about a person who is writing to express his conditions and answer the needs of the moment. And this doesn't mean that you can throw it back at me six years later in a general meaning, trying to make this a general assessment … about myself, my The legacy of Cultural Zionism, however, is not straightforward. Cultural Zionism was not distinct from efforts to build a Jewish state in Palestine -'Political Zionism'; rather, it shared with Political Zionism the belief in an ancient Jewish nation deriving from, and hence entitled to return to, Palestine.
Whilst possible meanings of a Jewish state have covered the vast ground between cultural celebration and explicit preferential treatment, one fact that has informed practices, policies, and discourses from the nineteenth century to the present is that a state constructed on the basis of being Jewish and electorally democratic requires more Jews than non-Jews. Cultural Zionists, both in Europe and Palestine, worked with and alongside those who were attempting to build such a Jewish state in Palestine, despite their professed concerns about its impact on the Other. 4 The spiritual father of Cultural Zionism, Ahad Ha'am, himself had declared that 'Palestine will become our spiritual center only when the Jews are a majority of the population and own most of the land' (cited in Shimoni 1995:111) . Thus, '[e] ven the most progressive Zionists were not able to articulate binationalism effectively' (Weiss 2004:113) .
Dissident Jeff Halper (2010) explains this lack:
Cultural Zionism was an intellectual hobby. No one really said, 'Yes, this is really a political programme, and let's have a congress and let's develop a party.' It was always really intellectual, so it … never presented itself or saw itself as an alternative to political Zionism.
If Cultural Zionism was not thought through in a practical way, perhaps it is the job of this study's dissidents to do this practical thinking. Abdel-Nour (2003 suggests that individuals acquire 'national responsibility' if they take pride in the acts of their so-called forefathers; perhaps those who lean on Cultural Zionism similarly acquire a responsibility to explain its political programme. If
Cultural Zionism offers a way of being in Israel/Palestine without being colonizers, as Halper (2010) purports, then how do the dissidents explain the logic of this?
Interestingly, in their attempts to explain, dissidents seem to almost 'accidentally' justify the establishment of Israel. When I ask Rabbi Jeremy Milgrom (2010) [A]ctually it never was evicted from its homeland, like the Zionist story goes, but it was evicted to the homeland. And yes, I suppose that gives it a particular right. It's been denied citizenship; it's been exterminated, genocided, evicted from dozens of countries. The only place it could actually reconstitute itself is there, its historical homeland.
Yiftachel suggests that 'the project is to make it as amicable as possible with the Palestinians'.
You know from the beginning it could be a multicultural or bi-ethnic binational state, etc., etc., etc. And so, and it could live, I could even live with an Arab majority, it doesn't really worry me as long as there is institutional, constitutional support for the continuation of the Jewish collectivity.
'But the Arabs never would have given that', I counter. The whole notion of Zionism coming here, it's not just a naïve migration to this empty land.
It's migration with an intention to redeem the land, to redeem the work. So when the Zionist movement and migration began and expanded, also those practices of other ways of expulsion or segregation or … superiority of Jews [expanded too]. … So it is difficult to talk about 1948 because before that there was already this history of violent behaviour here.
Despite his moral reliance on the 'other narratives that you can find hidden in Zionism', Bronstein struggles to enunciate genuine alternatives in Zionist history that would place him in this land without someone else's dispossession. The uncomfortable sense that 'there are no real solutions' is something that he has learnt to live with. 'You can solve [the problem] politically', he suggests, but still it doesn't really solve it in the sense that … there is no scar. It's there. It's forever there. You cannot really overcome in the sense that you forget it. … The Nakba is there forever … so in that sense there is no way out. I think it's very important to express it. … There's no way out. This final statement of Bronstein's can be applied more widely to the dissidents' dilemma. Not only is there no way out of Israel's past, but one cannot completely reconcile identification with both 'Hebrew' life and the Other. Engaging with Cultural Zionism's failure to offer adequate solutions to the Other's rejection takes the dissidents into an uncomfortable space of regret and responsibility; from here there is, indeed, no way out.
5

National Identity Discourses
In explaining the discontinuities outlined above, I trace the discourses that the dissidents use to construct their national identities. I have located six discourses; some dissidents almost exclusively use a single discourse, while others utilize several discourses. Below, I sketch these discourses with illustrations from the dissidents' narratives.
The Civic Discourse
The first discourse I call a 'civic discourse', invoking the civic-ethnic distinction (Greenfeld 1992; Spencer and Wollman 2005; Yack 1999 ). This kind of discourse in the Israeli context has been theorized by Shafir and Peled (1998) , but here I focus specifically on how it invokes Us and the Other. The premise of the civic discourse is that the state should in no way reify ethnic identity.
Whilst the hegemonic Zionist discourse in Israel depicts an ethnic Other, the civic discourse depicts this supposed Other as undifferentiated from Us -there is no Us and Other. (Davis 1995) .
The Binational Discourse
A larger cohort of my dissidents uses what I call a 'binational discourse'. This discourse generally involves advocating for a single state with institutionalized ethnic power-sharing along the lines of Lijphart's (1977) theories; Yiftachel (2006, ch. 12) and Benvenisti (2003) have put forward such models. However, the binational discourse goes well beyond political solutions (Raz-Krakotzkin 2011), building from an imaginative basis in which disparate identities coexist, flourish, and even intermingle. This is alluded to by Yiftachel (2007) , who 'hope[s] that love will prevail', Benvenisti, who dreams that 'something shared will evolve here' (Shavit 2003) , and perhaps most tantalizinglyif resistantly -by Rabinyan's (2004) depiction of herself as already enmeshed with her Other. In short, the binational discourse invokes the objective existence of more than one ethnic nation, and is philosophically disposed to achieving harmony and connection between them.
When the binational discourse is employed by this study's dissidents in their specific contexts, it connects the speaker subjectively to the 'Jewish nation'. The binational discourse depicts the 'Jewish nation' as a singular entity pre-dating the Zionist colonization of Palestine; hence, historical events are viewed through the framework of its purported interests. Dissidents who talk about 'their' history in this way then struggle to account for the harm to the Other therein, even as they seek to redress its contemporary consequences. Dissidents' desires for well-meaning coexistence cannot coherently be projected backwards, and dissidents may be compelled to endorse the establishment of the Jewish state despite professing to reject this model. Tamir (1993) . Such attempts have their limitations, however, illustrated by Rabinyan's (2004) belief in an illusory Other for whom her 'modest, lukewarm peace' will be enough, even as her actual Other (Hourani) aspires to a single, shared state.
The Post-Zionist Discourse
Another national identity discourse can be linked to a burgeoning literature loosely termed as 'postZionist' (Nimni 2003; Silberstein 1999) . I narrow the term here to mean a discourse that represents itself as secular, grown-up, and eager to end the political conflict. Yet the post-Zionist discourse does not destroy the category of Us altogether, nor does it place it on a designated path to equality with the Other. Crucially, while post-Zionism can talk about what should happen in the future, an endorsement of the Zionist project seems inherent in the depiction of its completeness (Nimni 2003; Silberstein 1999) ; it aims to 'improv[e] the (national) status quo, neither revolutionising the existing order nor completely undermining it' (Yadgar 2002:64) . In its efforts to invoke a less 'ethnic' imagining of the nation, post-Zionism is nevertheless bound by a need or desire to legitimate the nation's 'ethnic' past.
If it is seen as legitimate for 'the nation' to do what it did -and if the 'nation' at that historical moment is taken for granted as a singular, pre-existing entity -then mistreatment of the Other entailed in this process cannot be resolved. The post-Zionist discourse does not give the dissidents the tools to overtly engage with, nor take ownership of, this contradiction, presenting a world in which Us and the Other are still treated, at least on some levels, as separate entities with distinct histories and claims.
Activist Jeff Halper and critical journalist Gideon Levy can be seen to utilize a post-Zionist discourse.
Their narratives, which yearn for normality and an end to hysteria, nevertheless endorse the Zionist project through either its just basis (Halper) or its necessity (Levy) . The 'Jewish nation' is invoked as an organic actor in history; in resolving its European problems in Palestine, mistreatment of the Other became a necessary evil. 'I couldn't stop the flow of who's coming to here. I think this was a solution for the Holocaust', declares Levy (2010) .
Whilst Zionism can never be erased from Israel's past, as Eitan Bronstein (2010) The post-Zionist discourse lacks the analytical and conceptual basis to either abandon concepts of Us and the Other (the civic discourse), or to erect a framework upon which they are both celebrated equally (the binational discourse). In the absence of such a framework, existing power structures and interests are normalized and obscured.
The Hegemonic Zionist Discourse
All the discourses I have described above take as their point of departure the hegemonic Zionist discourse. This discourse underpins the very idea of a Jewish nation and the material reality of a Jewish state in Palestine, necessarily carved out against the wishes of the land's existing occupants.
Accompanying a settler-colonial project stratifying occupants of the land, the discourse has presented both the Jewish nation and 'national' claims to Palestine as self-evident, depicting opposition as irrational violence (Veracini 2006) . This discourse has been disseminated through organs of the state like its public schools and universities (Goldberg 2006; Sand 2009) This discourse can be characterized as having a ressentiment quality; a term originally used by Nietzsche to describe a hatred and envy of one's perceived oppressors (Morelli 1998 ). Greenfeld (1992 Greenfeld and Chirot 1994) uses ressentiment to describe the tendency of certain nationalist discourses to depict their Others in demonized terms whilst elevating the virtue of Us. This is particularly likely to occur when the nation is depicted in ethnic terms, because it is perceived as capable of being wounded and responding personally to insults (Greenfeld 2006:142) . The key component of ressentiment nationalist discourses is their stereotyping of the Evil Other which, because also depicted in ethnic terms (as the anti-Us), can be categorically differentiated and universally hated without nuance or blurring of boundaries. If this is the case … then we have to stop discussing and have to prepare for another war! … If this is how you see it, and people see it, they have to be prepared for that declaration of war they are declaring against me.
(Benvenisti 2010)
The ressentiment Zionist discourse is hegemonic because it offers a compelling explanation of the reality in which the dissidents live. They are swept back into it, not because they cannot resist the desire to demonize the Other, but because they struggle to find alternative ways of enunciating Us.
Whilst the binational, Kinder Zionist, and post-Zionist discourses represent genuine attempts to engage with the Other, they all continue to reify the Jewish nation. Using them, the dissidents cannot assimilate all of their aspirations with regard to the Other, particularly when it comes to the past; they are then compelled to fill the gaps with other discourses. The civic discourse is available, but most dissidents shy away from it because their ethnic identities are so thick. Only the hegemonic Zionist discourse offers a coherent account of who We are and why We are here; the dissidents reluctantly and perhaps unwittingly return to it, in the process reinvoking the polarized images of Us and Other that they are trying to resist.
The Inverted Ressentiment Discourse
A final discourse of inverted ressentiment can further illuminate our understanding of the relationship between ethnic identity and connection to the Other. The individual employing this discourse connects with the Other at the expense of bestowing hatred upon the collective to which he sees himself belonging, and hence upon himself.
I discovered this discourse in the personal narrative of jazz musician Gilad Atzmon (2010) , who argues that the behaviour and practices of Jews in Europe can be used to explain the Holocaust.
Atzmon professes great admiration for German nationalism and philosophy, and claims to be moved by expressions of Palestinian culture and nationalism. His personal narrative demonstrates an antagonism towards any notion of Jewish national belonging, whilst celebrating this tendency in other nationalisms. He makes repeated references to being a 'self-hater' and an 'anti-Semite', demonstrating how his 'ex-Israeli' identity remains embedded within a 'Jewish' one, apparently celebrating his (self-)hatred and proclaiming at one point that the 'self-hating Jew loves himself hating himself'.
Hence though he celebrates the Other, Atzmon can never become this Other, since the inverted ressentiment discourse maintains ethnic boundaries. The inverted ressentiment discourse banishes those using it to a purgatory in which universalistic identities appear illusory, but particularistic identities are either unappealing (by virtue of being despised) or unavailable (because one continues to belong to the despised Us).
Conclusion
I have suggested that the Israeli-Jewish dissidents in this study use a range of national identity discourses. The civic discourse urges its proponents to reject categories of Us and Other, but is such an anathema to the way that most Israeli Jews understand their identities that it remains extremely marginal, even amongst dissidents. Israeli-Jewish identities are instead framed by the hegemonic ressentiment Zionist discourse's compelling formula of the Good Us threatened by the Evil Other. Both identities are defined in ethnic terms and hence appear to offer clear and rigid boundaries for mapping a moral universe. Most of the dissidents in this study attempt to transform the moral depictions of these categories, keeping a thick 'Jewish' or 'Hebrew' identity at least partly intact.
They can then choose from inverted ressentiment, which succeeds in connecting with the Other only at the expense of overt self-hatred, and the more palatable options of binationalism, Kinder Zionism, and post-Zionism.
These three remaining discourses share some common traits. All of them conceptualize 'the Jewish nation' as an organic agent in history with needs and interests in its 'homeland' of Palestine. The binational discourse offers an evocative image of equality but cannot explain how settlement could have been attained against the wishes of the land's occupants. Kinder Zionism only recognizes the Other's needs and interests in a context of continued privilege, while post-Zionism also prioritizes Us over the Other using a language of pragmatism. Thus, although the alternative discourses can offer political prescriptions for the future, most cannot contend with the colonialism and dispossession of the Other in the Zionist project's history. Eitan Bronstein's poignant conclusion that there is 'no way out' of his dilemma is affirmed by the danger that doubt may merely reinforce the hegemonic discourse's depiction of a virtuous Us, engaged in deep soul-searching but reluctantly having to embrace militarism in the absence of viable alternatives (Laor 2009; Piterberg 2008 ), a situation captured by the phrase 'shoot and cry' (Segev 2002 ). Yet Bronstein's words can also offer something positive. The dissidents' awareness that they are unable to escape the contradictions of their situation can undermine the moral certainty of the ressentiment discourse, and hence more widely curtail its praxis against the Other. Thus, whilst there might be 'no way out' of the dissidents' dilemmas, the dilemmas themselves might offer a way out of violence. That, at least, has to remain our hope. 2. This demonization was put into practice when thirteen 'Israeli Arabs' were shot by state forces during political protests Peled 2007) ; another example is the explicit exclusion of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza from gaining Israeli citizenship by marriage, which affects the rights of 'Israeli Arab' prospective partners (Peled 2007; Schocken 2008) .
3. Rabinyan is of Persian origin; 'Persians are not Arabs. … But, something about in Israel, everyone who came from an Islamic country was contained in one sack' (Rabinyan 2010 ).
The 'Arab Jew' identity applied by her new friends challenges the Zionist discourse's depiction of these two identities as polar opposites (Shenhav 2002; Shohat 1999) .
4. For example, Hannah Arendt participated in political initiatives in Europe to send young Jews to Palestine (Kohn 2007) , presumably without clarifying to each of these young Jews that they should not build a Jewish state there.
5. It could be argued that the dissidents' regret at a tragic but unavoidable aspect of 'their' national history should suffice. However, the 'unavoidable tragedy' argument takes for granted the inherent virtue of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, rendering rejection by the 'natives' an unfortunate historical factor that produced the political conflict. If contemporary Israeli Jews rely upon Cultural Zionism, they are compelled to question this assumption.
6. I note that civic discourses within specific states still invoke Others outside those state boundaries. Crucially, however, these Others are not regarded as categorically different beings who can then be demonized or dismissed (see Greenfeld 2006) . 7. It could be claimed instead that rather than 'accidentally' justifying the establishment of Israel, the dissidents could hold two complementary positions: it was a good idea to establish Israel on the basis of the 1947 UN partition plan; and subsequent events like the exclusion of the refugees and the occupation render a one-state solution more apt. If the dissidents wanted to advance these complementary positions then they would not need to historically reject the establishment of Israel. But by identifying with Cultural Zionism, they do make such a rejection -until they try (and fail) to explain how Cultural Zionism could have produced a different outcome.
8. In describing the hegemonic Zionist discourse in such terms, I do not deny that evidence can be found that the so-called Other is indeed vengeful towards the 'Jewish' Us. Nor do I suggest that such a discourse is one-sided; indeed, it is mirrored in communities depicted as Palestinian or Arab by a negative construction of Jews. Both these points reinforce the ubiquity of ressentiment discourses in conflict situations. Ethnic identities and the qualities attached to them are reaffirmed by ongoing conflict, rendering banal the stereotyping and demonization of the Other (see Drexler 2008) .
9. The absence of a strong 'civic' voice in both contemporary and historical critiques of Zionism is striking. Whilst arguments for establishing Israel were strengthened by Nazi crimes, there was apparently no suggestion that the new state should be a haven for any other 'groups' facing mistreatment. Many virulent voices against Zionism have taken seriously the existence and rights-claims of 'the Jewish nation' and argued for national rather than individual equality and coexistence. The dissidents in this study repeatedly told me that although they liked the 'civic' ideal, it did not work in their context.
